Society

Danish personal ID data breach affects 8.8 million records

A Danish personal ID data breach has allowed unauthorised actors to access names, addresses and civil registration numbers belonging to about 8.8 million registered people, in what a cybersecurity expert has described as the largest breach ever involving Denmark’s central population register.

The Danish Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Digital Affairs said on Monday that the unauthorised access took place through a private Danish company that was legally allowed to search the Central Person Register (CPR).

The figure does not mean that 8.8 million people currently living in Denmark have been affected. The CPR system contains records for around 11 million people, including current residents, people who have left Denmark and people who have died.

According to Science, Higher Education and Digital Affairs Minister Christina Egelund, the unauthorised access continued for around ten days in September. Irregular activity was detected by the CPR administration on Friday, October 2, and the scale of the incident became clearer over the weekend.

The company’s access has since been blocked. The incident has been reported to the Danish Data Protection Agency (Datatilsynet), while the National Special Crime Unit is conducting a high-priority criminal investigation.

Authorities have not disclosed the company involved, who was behind the unauthorised access or how its legitimate access was compromised. It also remains unclear how much of the information that could be accessed was actually extracted from the system.

Image: Kevin Horvat / Unsplash

What is a CPR number?

A CPR number is Denmark’s ten-digit civil registration number, assigned to people registered in the country and used throughout Danish public administration.

The first six digits correspond to the person’s date of birth, while the final four distinguish between individuals. The number is used in interactions with public authorities and is closely integrated into areas including taxation, healthcare, social security and financial services.

This makes the CPR number much more important than an ordinary administrative reference number, although it is not in itself a password or a digital authentication system such as MitID.

Cybersecurity professor Jens Myrup Pedersen of Aarhus University told DR that the incident changes how the numbers should be regarded.

“It is the biggest breach ever against the Danish CPR register.”

Pedersen argued that Denmark can no longer assume that a CPR number is information unknown to third parties.

After briefing two parliamentary committees on Monday afternoon, Egelund said systems that require stronger authentication such as MitID do not appear to have been directly compromised by the incident.

Why the data breach matters

A CPR number alone does not normally give someone access to a bank account or public digital services. The problem is what can happen when it is combined with other information.

In this case, unauthorised actors were able to access combinations of names, addresses and CPR numbers, making fraudulent messages or calls considerably more convincing.

The data could be used for targeted phishing, identity fraud or attempts to obtain additional information by impersonating another person. Knowing a person’s address, age and civil registration number can also allow criminals to tailor scams to individual targets.

Danish authorities have therefore urged people to be particularly cautious about unexpected calls, emails and text messages, even when the sender appears to know personal information about them.

The official digital security portal Sikkerdigital has warned people not to disclose MitID information, passwords, one-time codes or payment details and not to follow unexpected links. People who have a concrete suspicion that their information could be used for fraud can also register a credit alert, making it harder for someone else to obtain loans or credit in their name.

The authorities have temporarily extended the opening hours of Denmark’s Cyberhotline because of the incident.

The initial investigation indicates that the names and addresses of people registered with official name and address protection were not included in the unauthorised access.

Another major cyber incident days after the DTU attack

The breach comes only days after another major cybersecurity incident involving personal data in Denmark.

On Friday, October 2, the Technical University of Denmark (DTU) disclosed that its identity and access management system had been compromised in a targeted cyberattack.

Up to 200,000 current and former students, employees, guests and partners could potentially be affected. The university said the system contained personal information dating back to 2003, including CPR numbers and full names, while records for active users could also include home addresses and other personal details.

DTU has not been able to determine exactly which information was downloaded or how many people were affected.

No connection between the DTU attack and the breach of the national CPR system has been announced. They are therefore being treated as separate incidents, although their proximity has put renewed attention on the security of Denmark’s highly digitalised public and institutional infrastructure.

Denmark will review the entire CPR system

The government has ordered a full security review of the CPR system and says measures have already been introduced to prevent similar access through other companies.

Egelund acknowledged on Monday that the security arrangements surrounding the company’s access had not been sufficient.

“It is a deeply serious incident.”

After briefing members of the Danish Parliament’s Business and Digital Affairs Committee and Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, the minister said it was still too early to determine whether some people might eventually need to be issued new CPR numbers.

The breach is also reopening a broader question for Denmark’s digital infrastructure: whether a number designed primarily to identify a person should continue to be treated by companies and institutions as evidence that someone really is who they claim to be.

For now, investigators are still trying to establish who obtained the information, how the company’s access was compromised and what happened to the data afterwards.

Shares:

Related Posts