EU sanctions on Russia could soon widen again after Finland and Sweden urged the bloc to add fresh economic measures targeting Russian trade and shipping, as the EU prepares its 20th sanctions package. Speaking on Monday, 12 January 2026, at Sweden’s annual security policy conference in Sälen, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen and Sweden’s Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard said the pressure should remain in place even if a ceasefire or peace deal is reached.
The Nordic proposal includes tariffs on all goods and services imported from Russia, tighter export restrictions (including luxury items), a tougher approach to Russia-linked maritime logistics in EU ports, and an import ban on Russian fertilisers, which Stockholm argues could cut Russia’s revenues by about €1.4 billion.
Tariffs on all Russian imports
The most far-reaching part of the initiative is the call for EU-wide tariffs on all products and services imported from Russia. Valtonen framed the proposal as a way to keep economic pressure steady over time, arguing that Russia’s threat to European security is long-lasting.
Unlike sector-by-sector restrictions, a broad tariff approach is designed to make any remaining trade with Russia structurally more expensive, limiting the incentives for EU companies to maintain supply chains and services that still connect to the Russian market.
Port services ban targeting Russia’s energy shipping
Finland and Sweden also want a stricter port services ban for vessels moving Russian oil, gas, or coal from Russian ports. The goal is to increase the operating costs of Russia’s energy exports by cutting off support services that are still provided inside the EU.
In practice, a port services ban can target activities that keep shipping routes viable, including port repairs, technical assistance, logistics services, and other forms of operational support. Nordic officials describe this as a way to further disrupt the networks that have helped Russian commodities reach global markets despite existing restrictions.
Fertilisers in the crosshairs
The ministers also highlighted Russian fertilisers as a priority target. Sweden argues that fertiliser sales remain a significant source of income for Russia, and that reducing EU purchases would tighten the financial squeeze.
The proposal seeks an EU import ban on Russian fertilisers, while pointing to alternatives such as increased European production and higher imports from suppliers like Canada. The Nordic case is that diversification is feasible—but requires clear political direction, because fertiliser markets are sensitive to price shocks and seasonal demand.
Luxury exports and tighter export controls
Stockholm and Helsinki are also pushing for additional export restrictions to Russia, including further limits on luxury goods. The idea is to close loopholes and reduce the flow of high-value consumer products that can still reach Russian buyers through legal trade channels or via re-exports.
While luxury exports are a small part of overall EU–Russia trade compared to energy, they have symbolic relevance in sanctions debates: they are meant to signal that the costs of war should be felt not only by industry but also by the segments of society that are most able to absorb restrictions.
How the proposal fits the EU’s 20th sanctions package
The EU has already adopted multiple rounds of sanctions since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with recent measures focusing on Russia’s shadow fleet, energy revenues, and sanction evasion networks. The Nordic proposal is aimed at shaping what comes next.
Whether these measures make it into the 20th package will depend on negotiations among EU member states and on how the European Commission, the EU executive, frames the legal pathway. Tariffs, in particular, raise questions about the balance between sanctions policy and EU trade rules—though Nordic governments argue that the security rationale is now central to the bloc’s economic decision-making.
Nordic security context, from Ukraine to the Arctic
The Sälen conference agenda underlined how the Nordic countries now connect EU economic policy with broader security concerns. Valtonen and Malmer Stenergard described sanctions as part of a long-term strategy to deter Russian aggression, while also discussing the need to protect the Arctic and the wider northern region.
For Finland and Sweden—both now framing their foreign policy around deterrence and resilience—the argument is that economic pressure must outlast diplomatic headlines. Even a pause in fighting, in this view, would not remove the incentives for Moscow to rebuild military capacity, sustain hybrid operations, and test Europe’s resolve.
In the coming weeks, the key question will be whether other EU capitals rally behind the Nordic push for tougher economic measures, or whether concerns about market impacts and enforcement will lead to a narrower, more incremental sanctions package.
