A Russian intelligence operation in Sweden aimed at influencing Swedish decision-making and discrediting Sweden, the European Union and NATO has been disrupted by the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, Säpo). The operation was directed by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and involved two Russian intelligence officers and an agent working at a foreign diplomatic mission in Stockholm, according to Säpo. TV4 reported that the security service had monitored the operation for an extended period before intervening.
How the Russian intelligence operation worked
According to Säpo, the two SVR intelligence officers had recruited a man working at an unidentified foreign diplomatic mission in Stockholm. The security service has not disclosed which country the mission represented or when the man was recruited.
Säpo says it was able to follow the operation “in detail”, documenting meetings between the agent and his Russian handlers at several locations in the Stockholm area. Surveillance material released by the agency shows meetings outdoors and at a restaurant, while Säpo says gifts were also handed to the agent.
The agent received assignments concerning central Swedish decision-making and Sweden’s relations with other countries. According to the security service, the information was intended partly to allow Russian intelligence to influence polarising political issues and ultimately to undermine Swedish decision-making and discredit Sweden, the EU and NATO. TV4 reported the same assessment from Säpo’s statement.
Christoffer Wedelin, Deputy Chief of Operations at Säpo, said the agency knew which assignments had been given and what information the agent had been asked to obtain. Säpo then intervened to interrupt parts of the activity and prevent further contacts. The agency’s assessment is that the operation ultimately failed to accomplish its objective.
The three people involved have left Sweden
The suspected agent and the two Russian intelligence officers have all left Sweden. According to Säpo, all three were covered by diplomatic immunity, preventing Swedish authorities from arresting or prosecuting them.
Minister for Justice (Justitieminister) Gunnar Strömmer said the government had been kept informed about the case. He said decisions had been taken concerning two accredited diplomats who were subsequently required to leave Sweden. Foreign Minister (Utrikesminister) Maria Malmer Stenergard separately confirmed that the accredited diplomats had been forced to leave because of their activities in the country.
Säpo has not disclosed exactly how it disrupted the operation or how those involved reacted once Swedish authorities intervened. The agency has said, however, that it prevented additional contacts and made further intelligence gathering more difficult.
Säpo says the operation was not linked to Sweden’s election
The disclosure comes during Sweden’s campaign ahead of the 13 September parliamentary election, but the government says the Russian intelligence operation should not be interpreted as an attempt to interfere with the election itself.
Strömmer said the operation had no assessed connection to the Swedish election. Instead, he described it as part of a broader and long-term pattern in which Russia acts aggressively in Sweden to advance its strategic interests.
That distinction is significant because the operation targeted political decision-making and potentially polarising questions, while the available evidence does not support describing it as an election interference operation.
Why Säpo is talking publicly about the case
Foreign intelligence operations are normally disrupted without extensive public disclosure. In this case, Säpo has deliberately released details and surveillance material to illustrate how Russian intelligence activities in Sweden operate.
Wedelin said the case showed that Russian intelligence and security services continue to rely on traditional human intelligence, including the recruitment of agents who can obtain information or approach other people on their behalf.
The SVR is Russia’s civilian foreign intelligence service and concentrates primarily on intelligence collection abroad, including political and economic information. Säpo’s account is also consistent with its broader assessment of the security environment: in June, the agency said Russia remained the main foreign security threat to Sweden, against a backdrop of intelligence activity and hybrid operations across Europe.
By making this operation public, Säpo is therefore presenting the case not only as a successfully disrupted intelligence effort, but also as a concrete example of how Russian intelligence activity in Sweden can combine traditional espionage with attempts to influence political processes. The case also shows why Swedish authorities continue to treat foreign influence and human intelligence networks as part of the country’s wider security environment.
