Greenland influence campaigns could intensify in the coming months, Denmark’s Security and Intelligence Service PET (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste) has warned, as major-power competition in the Arctic raises the risk that external actors attempt to shape public debate and political decisions in Greenland. In its latest assessment, PET says the goal of such operations could be to drive a wedge between Greenland and Denmark by amplifying, exploiting or even inventing disagreements inside the Danish Realm.
Why PET says Greenland is a growing target for influence operations
PET’s assessment points to a sharper international focus on the Arctic and to the likelihood that great powers will seek political leverage not only through diplomacy and investment, but also through information and influence activities. In Greenland’s case, PET warns that influence operations may aim to affect the political agenda and decision-making in Nuuk by shaping perceptions among voters, civil society and local media.
Influence campaigns can include coordinated messaging on social platforms, the use of misleading or polarising narratives, and attempts to frame political choices as a zero-sum conflict between Greenlandic and Danish interests. PET’s warning is notable because it places Greenland—an autonomous territory inside the Kingdom of Denmark—within the same broader security logic increasingly discussed across Europe: hybrid threats that operate below the threshold of direct confrontation.
Creating division between Denmark and Greenland is the core risk
PET highlights a specific strategic objective: manufacturing mistrust between Greenland and Denmark. The service warns that external actors can try to weaken the cohesion of the Danish Realm by leveraging sensitive issues—ranging from governance arrangements and domestic policy disputes to questions of identity, representation and future institutional choices.
In practice, PET suggests that influence campaigns may attempt to:
- Amplify existing disagreements in public debate through selective or misleading framing.
- Promote narratives that portray cooperation between Copenhagen and Nuuk as illegitimate or harmful.
- Pressure decision-makers by shaping “what people think” is politically feasible or socially acceptable.
For Nordisk and European readers, this is also a reminder that the targets of influence operations are often not national governments alone. Smaller communities and autonomous territories can be appealing targets because they may have limited media ecosystems, tighter social networks and fewer institutional resources dedicated to counter-disinformation.
Social media exposure makes small communities more vulnerable
PET’s concerns are sharpened by Greenland’s demographics and communications landscape. With a population of around 57,000, Greenland’s public sphere is relatively small, and social platforms play an outsized role in political conversation.
Several Nordic researchers and security analysts have warned in recent years that small information environments can be more exposed to coordinated manipulation, because a limited number of accounts, groups or pages may influence the tone of public debate. In such settings, a single viral narrative can spread quickly, while it can be harder for local institutions to debunk claims at scale.
PET does not claim that Greenland is uniquely vulnerable, but its assessment reflects a broader pattern seen across Europe: influence campaigns tend to focus on fracture points—identity questions, constitutional arrangements, and contentious social or economic debates—rather than on purely technical policy details.
What PET does—and does not—say about concrete incidents
PET’s assessment is framed as a risk warning, not as a public attribution of specific incidents to named actors. The service’s language suggests a heightened concern about potential operations and their intended effects, while also underlining that influence activity can take many forms and may be difficult to document publicly without compromising sources and methods.
That distinction matters. Intelligence agencies often avoid confirming operational details, especially when activities are ongoing or when evidence is sensitive. For Greenland, the practical implication is that authorities may focus on resilience measures—public awareness, media literacy, and institutional monitoring—rather than on public accusations.
