China’s Greenland message to the United States is that Washington should not “use other countries as a pretext” to pursue its own interests in the Arctic, after President Donald Trump again framed Greenland as a strategic asset needed to deter Russia and China.
The comments, delivered by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning at a regular press briefing, come as Denmark and Greenland have spent weeks responding to increasingly blunt USA rhetoric about the autonomous Arctic territory. Beijing’s intervention adds a third major power to an already tense dispute, and signals that China sees Greenland less as a bilateral issue and more as a test case for Arctic governance in a multipolar international system.
Beijing’s warning to Washington, in its own words
At a press conference on 12 January, Mao Ning said that the Arctic “bears on the common interests of the international community” and that China’s activities there aim to promote “peace, stability and sustainable development,” while staying within international law. She added that the USA “should not use other countries as a pretext for seeking selfish gains.”
The message is calibrated. China is not claiming Greenland as part of its own sphere, nor openly backing Trump’s critics. Instead, it is contesting the logic of Trump’s argument: the idea that China’s presence in the Arctic can be invoked to justify unilateral USA control over Greenland.
The timing also matters. Trump has repeatedly said the USA needs to “own” Greenland to prevent future Russian or Chinese moves—an argument that Greenland’s government has rejected, insisting that the island’s defence must be handled through NATO, not by a change in sovereignty.
Why China cares about Greenland and the Arctic routes
Greenland sits at the crossroads of three drivers of China’s Arctic policy: shipping, science, and resources.
On shipping, Beijing has for years argued that all states have rights and freedoms to conduct activities in the Arctic “in accordance with the law,” and it has promoted the idea of a “Polar Silk Road” linked to emerging northern sea routes as ice coverage changes.
On science, China has invested heavily in polar research, using scientific diplomacy to justify a larger role in Arctic governance. The approach supports China’s self-description as a “near-Arctic state” and its insistence that Arctic decision-making has implications far beyond the eight Arctic states.
Greenland, meanwhile, is strategically located between North America and Europe and hosts critical infrastructure and military interests tied to the USA and NATO. When Washington frames Greenland primarily as a security buffer, Beijing is likely to answer by pushing the narrative that the Arctic is a shared governance space—where rules, institutions, and international law should limit unilateral moves.
Minerals, rare earths and the limits of Chinese investment
China’s stake in Greenland is often discussed through the lens of critical raw materials, including rare earth elements used in electronics, renewable energy technologies, and defence supply chains.
Over the past decade, Chinese companies have explored or sought partnerships linked to Greenland’s mining sector, feeding a political debate in Nuuk about how to balance economic development, environmental concerns, and sovereignty. Several high-profile proposals have also triggered pushback in Denmark and among Greenlandic politicians concerned about strategic dependence.
This history helps explain why Trump’s team repeatedly cites China when discussing Greenland’s future. For Beijing, however, the priority is likely less about gaining a dominant position in Greenland specifically, and more about avoiding a precedent in which USA security claims can be used to narrow China’s access to Arctic research, shipping routes, and commercial opportunities across the region.
A multipolar Arctic, between international law and hard power
China’s response is built around a familiar legal-and-governance frame: international law, including the UN Charter, and the idea that Arctic stability serves the broader international community.
That framing does not erase hard power realities. Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark and is covered by NATO through Denmark’s membership. The USA already has long-standing defence arrangements in Greenland, and NATO allies have been debating how to strengthen deterrence in the High North.
Beijing’s line, however, reflects a broader shift: the Arctic is no longer treated as a peripheral theatre. It is increasingly discussed as part of a multipolar competition where the USA, China, Russia, the Nordic countries, and the EU executive all have overlapping—often conflicting—interests.
China is trying to position itself as a rule-abiding stakeholder that opposes unilateral moves, while keeping open the space for future economic and scientific engagement in the region.
