The EU military intelligence unit that the European Commission is now planning under President Ursula von der Leyen is intended to give Brussels a clearer, faster picture of security threats – from Russia’s war in Ukraine to cyberattacks and sabotage – at a moment of growing uncertainty over the future of US security guarantees.
From scattered briefings to a permanent intelligence cell
For now, the European Union does not have a centralised military intelligence structure inside the European Commission. Security assessments for EU leaders are pieced together from briefings by the European External Action Service’s Intelligence and Situation Centre (Intcen), reports from NATO, and information voluntarily shared by national security services.
The new unit, often described in Brussels as an intelligence cell, would change that. According to officials involved in the planning, it is expected to be set up inside the Commission’s Secretariat-General and report directly to von der Leyen. It would bring together a small number of experts seconded from member states’ services, with a mandate to collate, compare and analyse information for the Commission’s political leadership.
In practical terms, the unit is meant to provide more systematic early warning on issues such as hybrid attacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage against critical infrastructure and developments on the Ukrainian battlefield. Rather than running covert operations or recruiting agents, it would focus on turning fragmented national and international inputs into a shared strategic picture for EU decision-makers.
Ukraine, hybrid warfare and shifting US security guarantees
The immediate backdrop to the plan is the ongoing war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, and the wider confrontation with Russia. The EU has already stepped up its support for Kyiv, increased defence spending and launched new initiatives such as the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the broader Readiness 2030 agenda to boost its military capabilities.
At the same time, European leaders are increasingly aware that US security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted. Political debates in Washington, combined with previous threats to reduce American engagement in NATO, have strengthened calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defence and intelligence.
Hybrid warfare has become a central concern. European governments have reported repeated cyberattacks, GPS jamming, suspected sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines, as well as drone incidents near airports and military facilities. For the Commission, having an in-house military intelligence hub is seen as a way to connect these incidents, detect patterns and feed them into policy on sanctions, critical infrastructure protection and defence-industrial planning.
Turf wars in Brussels and questions over sovereignty
The proposal is controversial inside the EU institutions and among several member states. Intelligence has traditionally remained a national competence, with governments reluctant to share sensitive information beyond a limited circle of partners.
The EU already has Intcen within the European External Action Service, which produces classified assessments based on information supplied by national services and open sources. Critics of the new cell argue that creating another EU intelligence structure inside the Commission risks duplication, institutional rivalry and confusion about who speaks for the Union on security matters.
Some diplomats also worry about the balance of power in Brussels. A unit reporting directly to the Commission President could give the Berlaymont a stronger role in security and defence at the expense of the member states and the Council. Others fear that a larger circle of officials handling classified material could increase the risk of leaks or politicisation.
Commission officials insist that the aim is not to replace national agencies or NATO, but to improve the way information is used at the political level in Brussels. The new intelligence cell is presented as an analytical hub that will rely entirely on data provided by member states and partner organisations, without its own operational powers.
What has to happen before the spy unit becomes real
Despite the political signal sent by the Commission, the EU military intelligence unit is still at an early stage. Key questions remain about its size, mandate, oversight and how far member states are willing to go in sharing sensitive information with a body under the Commission President.
Any formal proposal will have to respect national control over intelligence and defence, and take into account the existing role of Intcen and other EU structures. Discussions are likely to focus on safeguards, including strict rules on access to classified information, data protection and parliamentary oversight.
The timing is also politically sensitive. With debates continuing over Europe’s defence spending, the use of frozen Russian assets and the future of security guarantees for Ukraine, some governments may see the new unit as part of a broader shift towards a more assertive, security-focused EU.
If implemented carefully, the initiative could strengthen the Union’s ability to understand and react to crises, from the eastern flank to the High North. For a Europe facing war on its borders and increasingly exposed to hybrid threats, a more coherent intelligence capacity in Brussels would be another step towards a more autonomous and resilient security order – even if it stops well short of a fully fledged European spy agency.
