The decision to include the USA on Danish threat list for the first time marks a notable shift in how Denmark understands its security environment, placing its closest ally alongside other major powers that can challenge the country’s interests.
Danish intelligence warns of shifting power poles
In its latest annual threat assessment, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, FE) describes a security landscape defined by growing pressure from several major powers at once. For the first time, the report identifies the United States as a negative factor in Denmark’s threat picture, even as Washington remains Copenhagen’s most important security partner.
FE director Thomas Ahrenkiel explains that Denmark now “balances between two poles”: on one side, a rising threat from Russia, and on the other, growing uncertainty about the US commitment to Europe. According to Ahrenkiel, smaller countries such as Denmark are looking at a world that resembles “more jungle law than a rules-based international order”, where even long-standing allies act more assertively to protect their own interests.
The assessment underlines that the USA uses its economic and technological strength as a power instrument, including towards allies and partners. This does not mean that Washington is considered an enemy, but it reflects a recognition that US policy choices can directly affect Danish security, sovereignty and economic resilience.
How the USA became part of Denmark’s threat assessment
The inclusion of the USA on Danish threat list reflects several overlapping trends. FE points to a pattern in which US administrations increasingly prioritise domestic security and strategic competition with China, sometimes at the expense of long-term commitments to European defence.
Shifts in US foreign and security policy, combined with sharply polarised domestic politics, translate into unpredictable signals for European partners. Changes in Congress, debates over continued support to Ukraine and discussions about NATO burden sharing have all contributed to Danish concerns that European security guarantees could become less stable over time.
The threat assessment also highlights how US economic and technological power can be used as leverage. Tools such as sanctions, export controls and restrictions on access to advanced technologies can have significant consequences for smaller allies, especially in sectors like defence, critical infrastructure and digital services. From a Danish perspective, this creates a dual dependency: the United States is essential for deterrence against Russia, but it can also exert pressure on allies through economic and technological measures.
By explicitly mentioning the USA in the threat assessment, FE signals that Danish security planning must account for risks linked not only to adversaries, but also to the strategic choices of close partners. This is less a break with the transatlantic alliance than a formal recognition of the complexity of today’s security environment.
Russia, hybrid threats and the pressure on Danish defence
Even with the USA on Danish threat list as a new element, Russia remains the primary driver of Denmark’s heightened threat level. FE reiterates that there is no immediate risk of a conventional military attack on Danish territory, but it describes a high risk of sabotage and hybrid operations against Danish and allied interests.
The report and recent public briefings refer to a pattern of activities that includes cyber operations, disinformation, GPS jamming, drone incursions and risky behaviour at sea and in the air. These actions are designed to test responses, intimidate populations and undermine confidence in political decision-making, especially regarding support for Ukraine and NATO cooperation.
In this context, Denmark is under pressure to strengthen its defence capabilities, including investments in air defence, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. The intelligence assessment supports a broader political debate on increased defence spending and on the need to protect Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands as strategically important parts of the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Nordic security, NATO and Europe caught between allies
The decision to list the USA on Danish threat list also has wider implications for the Nordic region and the European Union. With Finland and Sweden now NATO members, the Nordic area forms a crucial part of the alliance’s northern flank. Denmark’s intelligence community must therefore consider how US and Russian behaviour interact across the Baltic Sea, the Arctic and the North Atlantic.
On one side, transatlantic defence cooperation remains central to Nordic security. US forces, bases and exercises in the High North and the Baltic Sea area are considered key for deterrence and reassurance, and Greenland is at the heart of this equation. The long-standing US military presence at Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) anchors American early-warning and space capabilities in the Arctic, making the island strategically indispensable for Washington.
At the same time, recent US debates about acquiring or exerting stronger control over Greenland, coupled with the prospect of greater American military infrastructure on the island, have intensified political sensitivities in Copenhagen and Nuuk. Danish and Greenlandic leaders have repeatedly stressed that Greenland is not for sale and that decisions about the island’s future must respect both the Danish constitution and Greenland’s path towards greater self-government.
On the other side, FE’s assessment underlines that European and Nordic countries cannot fully outsource their security. They need to improve collective resilience, industrial capacity and political coordination inside Europe, including clearer frameworks for how to manage allied activities in strategically sensitive areas such as Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
The report feeds into a broader European debate on strategic autonomy: how the EU and its member states can remain closely aligned with the United States while developing more independent capabilities in defence, technology and energy. For Nordic countries that are strongly integrated in both NATO and the EU, this means managing a delicate balance between deep transatlantic ties and the need to hedge against volatility in US politics.
The appearance of the USA on Danish threat list is therefore less a sudden shock than a clear sign that Nordic and European security policy has entered a new phase, where even the closest partnerships are constantly reassessed through a more sober and strategic lens.
