EU security role is gaining strong support across the Nordic member states, with new European Parliament survey data showing clear majorities in Finland, Sweden and Denmark in favour of a more significant role for the Union in protecting citizens from global crises and security risks.
According to the European Parliament’s Spring 2026 Eurobarometer, 68 percent of EU citizens said the EU’s role in protecting people against global crises and security risks should become more important in the future.
Support is higher in the Nordic EU countries. In Sweden, 82 percent of respondents backed a stronger role for the EU in this area. In Denmark, the figure was 76 percent, while in Finland it reached 74 percent.
The survey was carried out between 9 April and 4 May 2026 in all 27 EU member states, with 26,421 interviews. The fieldwork included video interviews in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Finland sees EU security through Russia, NATO and resilience
In Finland, support for a stronger EU security role reached 74 percent, six points above the EU average. The result reflects the country’s changed security environment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Finland’s accession to NATO in April 2023.
For Helsinki, European security is now framed through several overlapping layers: NATO membership, EU coordination, border security, resilience against hybrid threats, military preparedness and support for Ukraine. Finland’s long border with Russia makes the issue especially concrete in domestic politics.
President Alexander Stubb has repeatedly linked Finland’s security outlook to wider changes in the international order. In his February 2026 speech at the opening of Parliament, he said that European security was being shaped by three main factors: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s rise as a great power and the new foreign and security policy doctrine of the United States.
Stubb also said that Finland and Europe must adapt to a world where power politics is becoming more central. “We must honestly acknowledge that the United States is undergoing change,” he said, while still describing Washington as an important ally.
This makes the Finnish Eurobarometer result more than a general pro-EU signal. It points to a security debate in which the EU is expected to complement NATO, support Ukraine, strengthen resilience and protect citizens against threats that are not limited to conventional warfare.
Sweden’s support reflects a new Nordic security map
In Sweden, 82 percent of respondents said the EU should play a more important role in protecting citizens from global crises and security risks. This was one of the strongest results among the Nordic EU member states and well above the EU average.
Sweden’s position has changed rapidly since 2022. The country applied to join NATO after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and became a member in March 2024, ending a long tradition of military non-alignment.
The Swedish government has also placed Ukraine and European security at the centre of its foreign policy. In its 2026 Statement of Foreign Policy, the government said support for Ukraine remained its foremost foreign policy priority and described it as an investment in Europe’s security, independence and future.
For Stockholm, the EU dimension is especially relevant in areas where Brussels has specific tools: sanctions, defence industry cooperation, military mobility, energy resilience, cyber policy and long-term support for Ukraine.
Sweden’s high level of support for a stronger European security policy therefore reflects a broader reorientation. NATO is now the foundation of Sweden’s collective defence, but the EU remains important for the political, economic and industrial instruments that support European security.
Denmark links EU defence to its new government programme
In Denmark, 76 percent of respondents said the EU’s role in protecting citizens against global crises and security risks should become more important. The result is also above the EU average and fits a political context in which defence has become a central priority.
The issue is now part of the agenda of the new Mette Frederiksen III government. The government programme presented in June 2026 placed Denmark’s sovereignty, Greenland, Arctic security and defence investment among its main priorities. It also pledged to stand firm on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark.
Denmark’s position is different from Finland’s and Sweden’s because Copenhagen has been a NATO member for decades. But its relationship with EU defence cooperation has changed significantly. In 2022, Danish voters abolished the country’s EU defence opt-out, allowing Denmark to participate fully in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
Since then, Denmark has taken a more active role in European defence cooperation. The country is also one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters. According to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Udenrigsministeriet), Denmark’s support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion amounts to about €9.7 billion in military support and about €1.1 billion in civilian contributions, excluding Danish support channelled through the EU.
The Danish case shows how the EU security debate also reaches countries with long-standing NATO traditions. For Copenhagen, the question is not whether the EU should replace NATO. It is how the EU can strengthen defence cooperation, industrial capacity, Arctic security and support for Ukraine alongside NATO.
Nordic EU countries are pushing the same debate from different angles
The latest Eurobarometer suggests that citizens increasingly expect the EU to act as a security provider, not only as an economic or regulatory actor. This expectation is particularly visible in the Nordic EU countries.
Finland’s 74 percent support reflects the pressure of geography, NATO accession and the need for resilience against Russia and hybrid threats. Sweden’s 82 percent support points to a rapid shift from military non-alignment to a broader European and transatlantic security posture. Denmark’s 76 percent support connects with the country’s new government programme, its Arctic priorities and its deeper participation in EU defence cooperation after the end of the defence opt-out.
Across the region, the main issue is not a choice between NATO and the EU. It is the division of labour between the two. NATO remains the core framework for collective defence, while the EU has tools in sanctions, industrial policy, infrastructure, energy, cyber resilience, enlargement and long-term support for Ukraine.
For the Nordic member states, those tools are becoming more important. The Baltic Sea, the Arctic and the EU’s north-eastern border are now central to European security planning. The next challenge for Brussels will be turning public support into credible action, while maintaining unity among member states and coordination with NATO.
