Avinode, the Swedish private aviation marketplace, is facing scrutiny after an investigation by Sweden’s public broadcaster SVT alleged that the platform was used by Russian brokers and wealthy clients to circumvent EU sanctions and arrange leisure travel in Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The report, published on April 23, says company representatives advised Russian clients to set up branches in third countries after the 2022 sanctions took effect. Avinode says it has tightened its due diligence, ended some business relationships and has no knowledge of links between some of the re-registered entities and sanctioned persons.
What the SVT investigation says about Avinode and Russian brokers
SVT reported that Avinode was used by members of the Russian elite, including oligarchs and sanctioned individuals, to continue booking international private flights despite EU restrictions introduced in 2022. According to the broadcaster, several independent sources said company staff recommended that Russian client firms create subsidiaries or offices in jurisdictions such as Turkey, Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates.
That restructuring, according to the investigation, allowed brokers to obscure Russian ties while preserving access to the European market for private jet services. SVT also said that, while posing as representatives of a sanctioned Russian citizen, its reporters were offered travel options by Russian brokers who confirmed that they used Avinode.
The findings do not in themselves establish a final legal breach by the company. But they raise broader questions about how digital aviation intermediaries verify clients, beneficial ownership and end users when sanctions are designed specifically to block indirect access to European services and infrastructure.
Why EU aviation sanctions also cover private jets and indirect control
The EU sanctions on Russia introduced after the 2022 invasion do not apply only to Russian commercial airlines. EU guidance states that the ban also covers private aircraft owned or rented by Russian citizens or companies, as well as non-Russian-registered aircraft that are owned, chartered or otherwise controlled by Russian natural or legal persons.
That matters in this case because the central issue is not only where a company is registered, but who ultimately controls it and whether a corporate structure has been used to evade restrictions. EU guidance also states that participating in activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the regulation is prohibited.
For compliance specialists, the case highlights a familiar weakness in sanctions enforcement: formal re-registration in a third country may not remove the underlying risk if the real ownership, control or client relationship remains Russian.
Avinode says controls were tightened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Avinode declined an on-camera interview with SVT. In written replies cited by the broadcaster, the company said it had strengthened its know-your-customer procedures after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and had terminated cooperation with some of the firms mentioned in the investigation.
The company also acknowledged shortcomings in its routines, but attributed them to the actions of a single employee. At the same time, it said it lacked sufficient documentation to end cooperation with some of the re-registered companies identified by SVT.
Avinode added that it does not have access to individual passengers’ personal data and is not responsible for checking passengers directly. According to the company, its platform connects operators and brokers, while the final agreement for each flight is concluded between those parties outside the platform.
That distinction may be commercially relevant, but it may not fully settle the sanctions question if investigators were to conclude that a platform knowingly facilitated access to services for restricted clients through intermediaries.
A Swedish aviation tech group with a dominant market position
The case has drawn attention partly because of Avinode’s position in the private aviation industry. According to company information cited by SVT, the platform handles around 8 million searches and 13 million trip requests each year and says it controls about 80 percent of the global market for this type of digital private aviation booking.
Founded in Gothenburg in 2001 by three Chalmers students, Avinode remains rooted in Sweden even after its 2024 acquisition by CAMP Systems International, a company within the Hearst group. That makes the story politically sensitive in Sweden as well as commercially significant for the wider European aviation sector.
A company with such reach is not a niche broker. It is a major piece of infrastructure in a market where enforcement often depends on identifying who is behind opaque company structures and cross-border charter requests.
Why the Avinode case matters beyond one Swedish company
The Avinode sanctions case comes at a time when the EU is continuing to expand and refine its sanctions architecture against Russia, while also putting more emphasis on anti-circumvention enforcement. The broader policy challenge is clear: sanctions are only as effective as the systems used to detect hidden ownership, intermediaries and service providers operating through third countries.
For Sweden, the story adds to a wider European debate over whether sanctions compliance is keeping pace with increasingly sophisticated methods of evasion. For the EU, it is another reminder that digital platforms can become strategic nodes in sanctions enforcement, even when they do not directly conclude the final contract.
What is not yet known is whether any authority will formally investigate the conduct described by SVT or whether the case will lead to enforcement action. But the allegations already point to a broader problem for Europe: restrictive measures can be weakened if the infrastructure around luxury travel, finance and logistics remains vulnerable to indirect access by sanctioned Russian networks.
