The security situation in the Nordic region has deteriorated further, with Russia presenting a serious and concrete threat to both Sweden and NATO. This is the stark conclusion of the 2025 annual report released on Tuesday by the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (Must). Unlike previous years, where threats were often described in general terms, the agency now warns that Russia has operational military planning specifically targeting Sweden and the alliance.
Escalating security dynamics
According to Lt. Gen. Thomas Nilsson, Head of Must, the threshold for Russian aggression is currently low. The report outlines that the military threat from Russia is expected to grow as the country gradually rebuilds and expands its military capabilities in Sweden’s immediate vicinity.
“The security situation has deteriorated further. The threats directed at Sweden are very serious, and we assess that they could worsen,” Nilsson stated.
The intelligence agency emphasizes that this is not a temporary spike in tension but a long-term structural shift in the European security architecture.
Three horizons of military capability
The report provides a detailed analytical breakdown of Russia’s potential military aggression across three specific timeframes, moving from limited strikes to full-scale territorial control.
- Immediate term (0-12 months): Must assesses that there is already a risk of a limited armed attack in Sweden’s immediate area. The objective of such an attack would be to signal intent or destroy specific military units and facilities rather than to seize territory.
- Medium term (3-5 years): Russia is expected to regain the capacity to launch armed attacks aimed at destroying larger military units. In this timeframe, they could potentially take control of limited areas or establish restricted air and naval superiority, effectively enforcing a blockade.
- Long term (5-10 years): The assessment predicts that Russia will possess the capability to conduct armed attacks with the goal of taking control of large land areas, while establishing accompanying sea and air dominance.
The rise of hybrid warfare and sabotage
Beyond conventional military threats, the report highlights an increased risk of hybrid attacks, specifically sabotage operations targeting the logistical and political support for Ukraine. Must notes that state actors are increasingly using a combination of military and non-military means to destabilize opponents while remaining below the threshold of open armed conflict.
These hybrid methods include disinformation campaigns, election interference, cyberattacks, disruption of critical trade flows, and sabotage against infrastructure. Lt. Gen. Nilsson warned against underestimating these tactics: “Hybrid warfare is not a kinder form of warfare. It is about damaging and weakening our societies and the cohesion within NATO and the EU.”
Deterrence and strategic rearmament
The report concludes that Sweden must consider increasing its rearmament ambitions to counter these evolving threats. The core of NATO’s strategy, and by extension Sweden’s, remains concrete deterrence.
“There must be so much military capability in the West that Russia cannot at any point calculate that they can win by creating a conflict,” Nilsson explained.
The agency stresses that the goal of hybrid threats is often to influence decision-making in a direction that favors the aggressor, making societal resilience and awareness as critical as military hardware.
