Europe can defend itself without the USA, Finnish President Alexander Stubb argued on 21 January 2026 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, as Donald Trump’s threats over Greenland and possible tariff retaliation sharpened a question European governments have tried to postpone for years: what would real strategic independence look like in practice.
Stubb’s message was not that the United States is irrelevant to Europe’s security, but that Europe already has enough assets to build credible deterrence and defence—if it can align budgets, procurement, command structures and political decision-making.
Why Europe can defend itself without the USA
Stubb’s case rests on a simple premise: Europe’s military mass exists, but it is fragmented.
He pointed to Finland as a concrete example of a model built for high-intensity defence. Finland combines conscription, a large trained reserve, and an approach in which defence planning is tied to society’s ability to keep functioning under pressure. In Davos, Stubb said Finland can mobilise 280,000 soldiers within weeks, that around one million people have completed conscription, and that the country maintains extensive civil defence shelters and stockpiles designed to reduce vulnerabilities.
The broader claim is political: Europe’s security does not begin and end with Washington. It depends on how European governments convert existing capabilities—particularly in the Nordics, Poland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and others—into a coordinated posture that can deter Russia and manage crises in the Arctic and the wider neighbourhood.
From Greenland to NATO credibility: why the debate is back
Trump’s pressure campaign over Greenland, paired with tariff threats against European governments, has made the strategic dilemma harder to avoid. Even if the immediate dispute is resolved diplomatically, the episode reinforces a basic reality: political reliability is part of military power.
For European leaders, the most destabilising element is not only the possibility of economic coercion, but the uncertainty it creates around alliance commitments and crisis management. If transatlantic coordination becomes more conditional or more transactional, Europe faces a stronger incentive to develop a defence architecture that can function even when the USA is absent, distracted or unwilling.
What Europe would still miss without the USA
Stubb’s confidence sits alongside an uncomfortable list of gaps. Europe has capable forces, but it is still heavily dependent on the USA for several strategic enablers that are hard to replace quickly.
A large share of the high-end intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that underpins modern operations—especially satellite coverage and the ability to fuse data fast—still comes from Washington. The same is true for strategic airlift and the logistics capacity needed to move heavy forces and sustain them at scale, particularly in a fast-moving crisis.
Europe also relies on American assets for parts of air and missile defence, and for the command-and-control systems that connect sensors, interceptors and decision-makers across borders. On top of that, Europe’s ammunition stockpiles and its industrial ability to replenish them quickly remain a weak point after years of underinvestment.
Finally, while France and the United Kingdom maintain national nuclear forces, Europe’s broader deterrence architecture has been shaped for decades by the USA, both politically and militarily.
This is where the argument shifts from “can” to “how”. A Europe that can defend itself without the USA is not a Europe that copies Washington; it is a Europe that builds the enablers it cannot improvise once a crisis is already underway.
A Nordic lesson: comprehensive security and resilience
Stubb also pushed a Nordic-style definition of security: wars are fought on battlefields but won through society’s ability to endure pressure. This is close to the comprehensive security approach long used in Finland and other Nordic countries, where preparedness spans energy, food, infrastructure, civil protection and public trust.
For a European defence project, the implication is practical. A credible deterrent is not just brigades and jets; it is the ability to keep ports open, protect grids and undersea cables, prevent panic, counter disinformation, and maintain continuity of government.
A political pathway: from coalitions to common European defence
The fastest-moving European cooperation in recent years has often happened outside formal treaty structures: ad hoc coalitions, quick ministerial coordination, and leader-level crisis management. That model can be a bridge—but it is not a substitute for sustained integration.
If Europe wants the option of operating without the USA, it needs to do three things at the same time. First, it has to build a shared planning culture, with common threat assessments and realistic contingency planning for the Arctic, the Baltic region and the North Atlantic. Second, it has to treat joint procurement and industrial scaling as a strategic priority, cutting duplication and ensuring that factories can deliver quickly in a crisis rather than years later. Third, it has to improve decision-making under pressure, with clearer political authority and procedures that allow fast responses when events move faster than normal diplomacy.
In this picture, the EU can play a structural role even when the mission remains NATO-aligned. The EU’s defence initiatives, financing tools and industrial policy can help turn coordination into capabilities that are useful regardless of the institutional label—NATO, EU missions, or a coalition.
The cost of becoming independent
Becoming less dependent on the USA is not cost-free. It requires sustained spending, but also a willingness to accept trade-offs: fewer national pet projects, more standardisation, and more cross-border industrial integration.
It also requires political honesty. Europe can build a defence posture that does not rely on American leadership, but only if European governments accept that independence means responsibility—and that responsibility includes hard decisions about budgets, mobilisation, and the balance between national sovereignty and collective action.
Europe may find an “off-ramp” in the Greenland dispute, as Stubb suggested in Davos. The larger question, however, will remain on the agenda: whether European states are prepared to turn a recurring crisis into a durable, credible and more independent European defence—including in the Arctic and the Nordic region, where the strategic stakes are rising fastest.
