The new Norway–UK defence agreement will make British forces more present in Norway and give them a larger role in the country’s defence, marking the most extensive bilateral military cooperation between the two governments in recent decades.
A historic Norway–UK defence agreement named after wartime ties
On 4 December in London, Norway and the United Kingdom are signing the Lunna House defence agreement, described by both sides as their most comprehensive defence cooperation deal in modern times. The agreement deepens an already close relationship between the two allies, linking Norway’s territorial defence even more closely to British forces and capabilities.
The pact is named after Lunna House in Shetland, which served as a base for the so‑called Shetland Bus operations during the Second World War. From there, Norwegian resistance fighters and British special forces carried out clandestine missions along the occupied Norwegian coast. By choosing this name, the two governments underline both the historical continuity of their partnership and the symbolic connection between wartime solidarity and today’s security challenges.
According to Norwegian and British officials, the agreement is meant to respond to a more unstable security environment in the North Atlantic and the High North, where Russian military activity, hybrid operations and the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure have become central concerns.
More British troops, equipment and exercises on Norwegian soil
A core element of the Norway–UK defence agreement is a stronger British military presence in Norway. UK Royal Marines will train and exercise in Norway more frequently and not only during the traditional winter exercises in the Arctic and sub‑Arctic regions. The goal is to integrate British units more deeply into Norway’s defence plans so they can reinforce the country rapidly in a crisis or armed conflict.
The agreement also paves the way for pre‑positioning British equipment and ammunition on Norwegian territory, as well as building or adapting infrastructure to receive British forces at short notice. In practice, this could mean that British units will be able to deploy to Norwegian bases with much less advance notice than today, relying on stocks already stored in the country.
Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has presented the deal as part of a broader shift towards tighter defence integration with key European allies. He has underlined that the threat picture in Norway’s neighbourhood is shaped above all by Russia’s war in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, by China’s growing global role, and that closer allied support is therefore seen as essential for national and regional security.
Joint frigate fleet and drones to monitor the High North
The new agreement builds on decisions taken earlier in 2025, when Norway chose the United Kingdom as its strategic partner for the purchase of Type 26 frigates, in what Oslo has called the largest single defence investment in its history, worth around €12 billion. The two governments have already agreed that their future frigates should be as similar as possible, with shared technology, maintenance and training.
Under the Lunna House framework, Norway and the UK aim to operate a joint anti‑submarine frigate fleet of 13 ships – eight British and at least five Norwegian – capable of working almost interchangeably. The ships will patrol the waters between Greenland, Iceland and the UK, as well as the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea, where Russian submarines and surface vessels regularly transit between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.
Another priority in the agreement is the development and deployment of drones and autonomous maritime systems. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, the two countries plan to invest in relatively low‑cost unmanned systems that can track submarine movements, monitor activity around offshore installations and patrol large sea areas in the High North. These platforms are expected to operate alongside frigates and patrol aircraft, filling gaps in surveillance and strengthening early warning.
Protecting undersea infrastructure and NATO’s northern flank
The Norwegian–British defence cooperation is explicitly framed as a contribution to the protection of undersea infrastructure, including fibre‑optic cables and gas pipelines that are vital for communication, energy supplies and financial flows between Europe and North America. Western officials have repeatedly warned that this infrastructure could be targeted by hostile states in a crisis or as part of so‑called hybrid operations.
By linking British naval assets and Norwegian territory more closely, the Lunna House agreement is also meant to reinforce NATO’s northern flank. The joint frigate fleet and expanded British presence in Norway complement existing Allied exercises and deployments in the region and come at a time when Finland and Sweden have joined the Alliance, creating a continuous NATO land border from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic.
For Norway, a relatively small country with a long coastline and large maritime areas to monitor, deeper cooperation with the UK is seen as a way to ensure credible deterrence and rapid reinforcement. For the UK, the agreement confirms its role as a key European security actor after leaving the EU, with a specific focus on the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Domestic debate and implications for Nordic and European security
The new Norway–UK defence agreement has been presented by the Norwegian government as a natural extension of long‑standing cooperation with the UK, but it is also likely to stimulate debate at home. Critics in Norway have in the past raised concerns that a permanent or expanded allied presence could blur lines of national control, while supporters argue that credible defence in today’s security environment is impossible without close integration with allies.
The agreement comes on top of other recent bilateral and mini‑lateral initiatives in Europe, as governments adjust to a more confrontational relationship with Russia and a more uncertain global order. For the Nordic region, the deal adds another layer to an emerging Nordic‑British security web that now includes NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, closer Nordic defence planning, and intensive cooperation on maritime surveillance and air policing.
For the European Union, whose member states include Norway’s Nordic neighbours and many of the countries most exposed to Russian activity, the Lunna House agreement highlights how security in the High North and the North Atlantic depends on a mix of EU, NATO and ad hoc partnerships. While the UK is no longer part of the EU, it remains central to the defence of Europe’s northern approaches and to the protection of critical sea lanes and energy routes.
In the coming months, Oslo and London are expected to translate the political framework of the Lunna House agreement into detailed plans for exercises, infrastructure, procurement and pre‑positioning. How these choices are implemented will shape not only Norway’s defence posture, but also the wider balance of deterrence and reassurance in northern Europe.
