Finland’s anti-personnel mines will return to service from 10 January 2026, after the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Treaty, the Finnish Defence Forces (Puolustusvoimat) confirmed at a press briefing in Helsinki. The plan is part of a wider modernisation that accelerates the adoption of unmanned systems on land and in the air.
Withdrawal timeline and legal basis for anti-personnel mines
Finland’s parliament approved the exit from the Ottawa Treaty in June 2025, and the government formally notified the United Nations in July. Under the convention’s rules, withdrawal takes effect six months later, enabling Finland to reintroduce anti-personnel mines from January 2026.
Before the 2012 ban, Finland held roughly one million simple mines; the Army now aims to rebuild a comparable capability. Officials say some existing devices—such as fragmentation mines—can be employed once the deadline passes, while procurement of more advanced, sensor‑equipped or remotely controlled systems is being explored.
Rebuilding anti-personnel mine capability and domestic procurement
Colonel Riku Mikkonen, Inspector of the Army’s Engineer Corps, said the objective is to “complement Finland’s defence” with rapidly deployable obstacle systems. The Defence Forces previously manufactured mines domestically; going forward, they intend to source from Finnish industry to ensure supply security. The rebuild will prioritise rapid fielding, standardised training and integration with existing obstacle, artillery and engineering units.
Unmanned systems in Finnish Army modernisation
Commander of the Finnish Army (Maavoimat) Pasi Välimäki underlined that lessons from Ukraine do not replace heavy forces: Finland will retain battle tanks and artillery while adding layered unmanned systems for reconnaissance, strike and logistics. Soldier protection has been upgraded with new body armour and ballistic eyewear, while infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) are being modernised.
A life‑extension upgrade keeps Finland’s MLRS in service into the 2050s, enabling precision fires out to 150 kilometres. Additional K9 self‑propelled howitzers continue to arrive under previously agreed options. The largest single acquisition ahead is expected to be new IFVs to replace ageing BMP‑2 platforms.
Border strategy along the 1,340 km Russia frontier
Finland shares a 1,340 km land border with Russia—the longest such border in both the EU and NATO. Military planners argue that layered obstacles, including anti-personnel mines, can slow or channel an aggressor along this extensive frontier, buying time for fires and manoeuvre.
The mine policy is framed as part of a deterrence-by-denial posture alongside surveillance, limited border barriers and expanded reservist readiness.
Nordic and EU debate on landmines and humanitarian risk
Helsinki’s move aligns with similar decisions under discussion or taken by other EU and NATO members on the eastern flank. Proponents argue that anti-personnel mines have renewed military utility in large‑scale land warfare, citing the battlefield in Ukraine.
Humanitarian organisations warn that reversing decades of mine‑ban progress increases long‑term risks to civilians and complicates future clearance. Finnish authorities state they will pair the reintroduction with strict command-and-control, mapping and clearance procedures to mitigate harm.
Next steps: doctrine, training and NATO interoperability
Implementation will depend on doctrine, training and industrial capacity. Key milestones include the first procurement contracts, updated rules for deployment and storage, and interoperability work within NATO.
For Nordic and EU security, Finland’s choices will shape how the alliance balances deterrence needs with humanitarian law commitments along its northern flank.
